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This paper explores the fiscal effects of tariff reduction for the Caribbean Community. 
The paper concludes that Caribbean countries are likely to experience short-run revenue 
shortfall as a consequence of trade liberalization.  Indications are that the shortfall could 
be as much as a 45 per cent decline in customs duties. In order to mitigate this substantial 
effect, the ongoing efforts at fiscal reform must continue, paying particular attention to 
lowering tax exemptions, enhancing indirect tax systems, improving tax collection and 
administration and modifying the tax structure to reflect lower dependence on trade taxes 
for fiscal receipts.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Since the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market, Caribbean leaders have displayed an unequivocal commitment to Free 
Trade both within Community Member States and internationally. The decision in 1992 
to design and implement the CARICOM Single Market and Economy reaffirmed this 
commitment. The Caribbean Community having achieved free trade in goods is now 
moving ahead with free trade in services. 
 
At the international levels, Member States of the Caribbean Community signed on to the 
Marrakesh Agreement that established the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and set the 
rules that govern global trade. The Caribbean Community has signalled its intention to 
participate in the hemispheric free trade arrangement, the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). Moreover Caribbean economies are highly open, and have been 
participating in global trade for centuries. 
 
It is clear, that CARICOM Member States understand the benefits of free trade, it is clear 
that Member States are committed to trade liberalization, but unfortunately, in many 
ways the global environment has not been kind to the Caribbean. The Caribbean 
continues to experience marginalization in the new international order. The erosion of 
preferential markets, primarily in Europe, adverse commodity price shocks and stiff 
competition in tourism services, has seriously affected export earnings and export 
earnings capacity in all Member States. Finance for development, has become 
increasingly difficult to access, and this has increased pressure on domestic resources to 
finance investment, growth and development. 
 
A substantial element of trade liberalization is the lowering of import tariffs and removal 
of import restrictions. Caribbean governments especially given the backdrop of 
worsening fiscal deficits are concerned that tariff reduction could have substantial 
negative revenue effects which could seriously affect their ability to grow their 
economies, alleviate poverty, and keep debt burdens low.  
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The concern is acute for those Member States where dependence on import duties as a 
source of revenue is particularly high.  The purpose of this paper is to explore what the 
impact on revenues might be. The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a 
theoretical discussion of the fiscal effects of trade liberalization, Section III outlines the 
characteristics of Caribbean economies and then Section IV examines the trade structure 
and trade commitment of the region. A description and analysis of the tax and tariff 
structure is presented in Sections V and VI. In section VII, we discuss the fiscal effects of 
tariff reduction on the Caribbean Community given there current fiscal positions, trade 
structure and tax systems and in section VIII and IX after the likely effects have been 
established, policy solutions are discussed. Section X concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. Theoretical  Considerations 
 
It is widely acknowledged that there are substantial gains from trade that result from 
participation in a free trade area, but when fiscal revenue is accounted for, it is not clear 
what the net welfare effect will be. Bhagwati, Greenaway, and Panagariya (1998) have 
stated that loss of tariff revenues from inter participant trade can exceed the net gains 
usually identified in the Harberger-Johnson triangles thus resulting in an overall welfare 
loss (Nicholls et al: 1999).  In this context fiscal loss and adjustment, therefore takes on 
added significance in the short run. 
 
The elimination of trade barriers among members of a Free Trade Area (FTA), while 
maintaining barriers with the rest of the world can lead to trade creation and trade 
diversion of particular products. Trade creation refers to the substitution of high cost 
production for lower cost source of supply inside the integrated area, leading ultimately 
to lower domestic prices. Trade diversion is the opposite of trade creation and occurs 
when higher cost production from the Free Trade Area replaces lower cost sources of 
supply from third countries (OECD: 2000). The net welfare effect involves a comparison 
of the trade creating gains with the trade creating losses (Nicholls et al: 1999) an analysis 
associated with Viner (1950). To determine the scope for trade creation and trade 
diversion exante, a comparison of the production cost structure of the  potential Free   6
Trade Area participants and also the rest of the world must be made for particular 
products. 
 
Nicholls et al (1999) outline some of the weaknesses of the Vinerian theoretical 
apparatus. Among them the whole issue of distribution of trade gains. Distribution is of 
special concern to small vulnerable CARICOM states since as mentioned before, 
particular distributions could result in overall net welfare losses for particular countries in 
a Free Trade Area because of the significance and magnitude of fiscal losses. 
 
The fiscal impact of a tariff reduction depends upon a number of factors such as the size 
of the tariff reduction, the response of imports to the tax change, the relative importance 
of import tariffs as a source of government revenue, the response of the other tax bases to 
the tariff reduction and how those tax bases will impact on total revenue, the number of 
tariff line items that are above and below the maximum revenue tariff, the level of initial 
tariff, and the share of those imports subject to high tariffs in total imports. 
 
It is expected that countries with heavier dependence on trade taxes as a source of fiscal 
revenue will be more severely affected, but what is also of critical importance is the 
response of exporters and importers in CARICOM to the reduction in tariffs. It is 
important because, the level of imports and exports and overall economic activity affects 
the revenue that governments collect. The extent of the impact of trade liberalisation on 
the Caribbean also depends on the extent of substitution of local production for goods and 
services, which are cheaper from other hemispheric partners (Worrell: 1993). 
 
 
III.  Economic Characteristics of CARICOM countries 
 
Caribbean economies are typically small and highly open to international trade. The total 
mid-year population of the Caribbean Community, in 1999 was 6,341,382 and with the 
exception of Guyana and Suriname who take up 87.1 per cent of the Community land 
mass, the physical size of each Member State are all below 23,000 square kilometres. 
Most Community countries are islands that lie in the hurricane belt and earthquake zone 
of the Caribbean Sea, thereby making them acutely vulnerable to natural disasters.   7
 
These countries are highly open to international trade relative to other countries and 
Table 1 illustrates this by presenting the global insertion index for the region and its sub 
groupings. In 1997 the Community global insertion index
1 was 42 per cent indicating a 
very globalised economy. Table 1 also shows total GDP, another measure of size. 
 
Caribbean economies also possess highly concentrated production structures, usually 
focussing very heavily on one or two locomotive sectors such as banana exports, oil and 
natural gas in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, rice, sugar, bauxite, and tourism services. 
 
Table 1  CARICOM Global Insertion Index: 1990 and 1997 
1990  1997 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Exports(X)  Imports(M)  (X+M)/2  GDP  Global 
Insertion 
Index 
Exports(X)  Imports(M)  (X+M)/2  GDP  Global 
Insertion 
Index 
CARICOM  11,1174.4  14,194.9  12,656.1  36,341.5  0.35  15,872.1  26,030.2  20,951.1  49,335.4  0.42 
MDCs  9,826.5  10,974.5  10,400.5  30,874.0  0.34  14,784.4  22,682.9  18,733.6  43,054.7  0.44 
Barbados  580.7  1,900.7  1,240.7  4,644.3  0.27  763.9  2,687.9  1,725.9  5,900.3  0.29 
Guyana  501.9  595.3  548.6  1069.9  0.51  1,480.6  1,659.8  1,570.2  2,006.9  0.78 
Jamaica  3,123.5  5,068.3  4,095.9  11,476.0  0.36  3,742.5  8,404.9  6,073.7  16,737.0  0.36 
Suriname  …  …  …  …  …  1,815.9  1,618.1  1,717.0  2,381.6  0.72 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
5620.3  3,410.2  4,515.3  13,683.8  0.33  6,981.4  8,312.2  7,646.8  16,028.9  0.48 
LDCs  1,290.9  3,220.4  2,255.6  5467.5  0.41  1,087.7  3,347.3  2,217.5  6,280.7  0.35 
Belize  348.4  570.4  459.4  1,094.6  0.42  475.7  772.4  624.1  1,669.4  0.37 
OECS  942.5  2,650.0  1,796.2  4,372.9  0.41  612.0  2,574.9  1,593.4  4,611.3  0.35 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
76.7  518.9  297.8  1,057.2  0.28  …  …  …  …  … 
Dominica  148.6  318.4  233.5  449.1  0.52  141.3  363.3  252.3  660.0  0.38 
Grenada  70.8  294.2  182.5  596.9  0.31  70.1  452.7  261.4  850.2  0.31 
Montserrat  4.7  119.2  61.9  181.2  0.34  …  …  …  …  … 
St Kitts & Nevis  74.7  299.0  186.8  429.8  0.43  110.9  397.4  254.1  742.3  0.34 
St Lucia  343.7  733.0  538.4  1,123.5  0.48  165.3  896.7  531.0  1,565.7  0.34 
St Vincent & Gren  223.3  367.4  295.4  535.2  0.55  124.4  464.7  294.6  793.1  0.37 
 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat 
Notes: … means Data not available/Total represents the sum of available data 
 
Table 2 indicates that in all Caribbean economies services form a significant part of total 
output. For the year 2000, government services ranged from 7.4 per cent of total output in 
Trinidad and Tobago to 19.8 per cent of total output in St Vincent and the Grenadines, 
thus indicating the significant role of government in economic activity and underscoring   8
the importance within a Caribbean context of maintaining revenue stability. Guyana and 
Dominica have production structures heavily skewed toward agriculture whereas in 
Trinidad and Tobago, manufacturing contributes significantly to total output. Belize’s 
locomotive sectors are balanced between agriculture and manufacturing whereas St 
Vincent has a moderate contribution by agriculture to its output. In the other countries 
tourism services contribute significantly to Gross Domestic Product.  
 
The macro economy of the Caribbean Community is characterised by low to moderate 
rates of inflation, high levels of unemployment, stable exchange rates and interest rates, 
and high and sustained inflows of foreign direct investment. In general public sector 
management has been prudent, with many governments trying to expand public savings, 
curb spending, improve efficiency in collection and improve implementation of projects. 
On the monetary side, most Member State Central Banks maintain stable exchange rate 
regimes and limit lending to the governments. Table (i) in the appendix summarizes 
economic indicators for Members of the Caribbean Community. 
Table 2  Percentage Distribution of Gross Domestic Product by Economic Activity in Current Prices 
Economic 
Activity 
Antigua  Barbados  Belize  Dominica  Grenada  Guyana  Jamaica  StKitts  StLucia  StVincent  Suriname  Trinidad 
Agriculture  4.0  4.9  12.6  18.2  7.7  34.6  7.0  2.8  7.7  10.8  7.1  1.3 
Mining and 
Quarrying  1.7  0.7 
 
0.7  0.8  0.5  15.4  4.2  0.4  0.4  0.2  12.7  12.8 
Manufacturing  2.3  5.8  13.8  7.2  7.6  10.1  13.5  10.5  5.1  5.2  11.8  17.8 
Electricity and 
Water  3.4  3.3 
 
3.3  4.3  5.5 
 
-  3.6  1.8  4.4  6.1  4.6  2.0 
Construction  12.9  6.2  7.1  8.2  10.4  4.5  9.6  16.3  8.4  11.7  3.7  10.1 
W/Sale and 
Retail  11.0  17.8 
** 
13.0  10.8 
4.1 
20.1  15.2  13.2  17.1  27.6  17.1 
Hotels and 
Restaurant  11.6  11.2 
 
21.6  2.4  9.0 
   
6.6  14.1  2.4  -  3.2 
Transport   12.2  **  **  9.6  15.1  **  **  6.9  12.1  13.8  6.6  8.7 
Communications  7.9  10.0  9.9  11.4  8.2  6.8  10.1  6.0  7.1  6.7  14.2  ** 
Banks and 
Insurance  9.0 
**  7.2 
13.2  9.9 
3.2 
7.6  14.2  9.4  8.0  14.2  ** 
Real Estate and 




5.9  3.5  3.4 
 








11.6  17.8  16.4 
 





Other Services  7.6  -  9.9  1.4  3.2  1.5  7.3  4.3  5.0  1.9  1.5  4.5 
Less Imputed 




3.5  11.0 
 
7.8 
   
7.1  7.0 
 
















6.9  - 
 





Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat 
Note: ** means the item is included in the row below. The data for Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and 
Suriname is in 1999 whereas for the others it is 2000.
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 The Global Insertion Index is calculated by taking the average of exports and imports, as a percentage of 
GDP.   9
 
 
IV.  Caribbean Community Trade Structure  
 
The United States is CARICOM’s principal trading partner but in recent times, trade with 
other hemispheric partners has been growing, largely on account of Trinidad and Tobago 
and Jamaica. Tables 3 and 4 present the distribution of CARICOM imports and exports 
respectively by principal source and destination. 
 
Table 3 Distributions of CARICOM Imports by Principal Sources: 1980-1998 (Percentage) 
Source of Imports  1980  1985  1990   1995  1996  1997  1998 
USA  27.8 38.3 41.2 42.6 44.4 47.7 46.2 
European  Union  15.8 16.5 15.5 15.2 14.1 14  13.7 
CARICOM  8.8 9.7 9.2 9.8 9.7 9.1 9.5 
LAIA  5.6  9.1  11.2 9  12.2 9.8  10.4 
Selected  Asian  Countries  6.6 10.2  7.7 8.4 8.2 8.4 9.6 
Rest of the World  35.4  16.2  15.2  15  11.4  11  10.6 
 
Source: A Quick Reference to Some Summary Data 1980-1996 and CARICOM Secretariat 
Notes: LAIA – Latin America Integration Association 
Selected Asian Countries are China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand 
1990 Excludes data for Antigua and Barbuda 
1995 Excludes data for Antigua and Barbuda, Guyana and Montserrat 
1996 Excludes data for Antigua & Barbuda, Guyana, Montserrat, St Vincent & the Grenadines and 
Suriname 
1997 Excludes data for Antigua & Barbuda, Guyana, Montserrat and Suriname 
1998 Excludes data for Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Guyana, Montserrat St Kitts & Nevis and Suriname 
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Table 4 Distribution of CARICOM Exports by Principal Destinations.: 1980-1998 (Percentage) 
Destination of Exports  1980  1985  1990   1995  1996  1997  1998 
USA  48.7 47.2 40.7 34.1 38.5 35.3 35.2 
European  Union  16.5 17.8 20.6 20.9 18.0 18.1 16.9 
CARICOM  8.9  12.8 12.2 16.5 18.3 19  22.5 
LAIA  1.9 2.1 2.8 5.4 5.2 4.6 3.7 
Selected  Asian  Countries  0.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 0.9 1  0.6 
Rest  of  the  World  23.6 18.8 22.5 21.6 19.1 22  21.1 
 
Source: A Quick Reference to Some Summary Data 1980-1996 and CARICOM Secretariat 
Notes: LAIA – Latin America Integration Association 
Selected Asian Countries are China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand 
1990 Excludes data for Antigua and Barbuda and Montserrat’s Re-Exports 
1995 Excludes data for Antigua and Barbuda and Guyana  
1996 Excludes data for Antigua & Barbuda, Guyana and Suriname 
1997 Excludes data for Antigua & Barbuda, Guyana, Montserrat and Suriname 
1998 Excludes data for Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Guyana, Montserrat St Kitts & Nevis and Suriname 
 
 
Table 5 illustrates CARICOM’s small size in the hemisphere. In 1998 CARICOM 
accounted for 0.3 per cent of Western Hemisphere exports and 0.5 per cent of regional 
imports. 
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Table 5 Percentage Share of Western Hemisphere Trade by Regional Arrangement, 1994-1999 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Exports        
NAFTA  86.0 85.9 85.6 85.9 87.1 88.1 
United  States  59.7 58.8 58.1 58.4 58.7 57.2 
LAC 21.3 22.2 23.3 23.5 23.0 23.2 
LAC excl 
Mexico 
14.0 14.1 14.4 14.1 12.9 11.9 
MERCOSUR      7.2 7.1 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.1 
Andean 
Community      
4.0 3.8 4.3 4.0 3.3 3.6 
CARICOM  0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 n.a. 
CACM  0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 
        
        
Imports        
NAFTA  88.3 86.6 86.8 86.1 87.1 90.2 
United  States  66.3 65.7 65.6 64.2 64.0 66.9 
LAC 19.4 19.8 20.4 22.0 21.7 19.1 
LAC excl 
Mexico 
11.7 13.4 13.2 13.9 12.9 9.8 
MERCOSUR      6.0 6.7 6.9 7.3 6.7 5.2 
Andean 
Community  
3.0 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.1 2.3 
CARICOM  0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 n.a. 





Table 6 Significance of the Western Hemisphere in CARICOM Trade 
 
 1994  1996  1998 
Western Hemisphere 
Import Concentration 
73.4 73.3 72.2 
Western Hemisphere 
Export Concentration 
74.2 76.2 76.2 
 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat 
Import Concentration is calculated by taking total imports from the western hemisphere as a percentage of 
total imports from all sources. 
Export Concentration is calculated by taking total exports to the western hemisphere as a percentage of 
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Table 6 shows the concentration of CARICOM trade within the Western Hemisphere, 
CARICOMs imports from sources within the hemisphere. CARICOM imports from 
hemispheric partners amounted to 72.2 per cent of total CARICOM imports in 1998 
whereas CARICOM exports to the hemisphere constituted 76.2 per cent of total 
CARICOM exports. This suggests that the Free Trade Area of the Americas will have the 
largest impact on Caribbean economies. 
 
CARICOM Trade Commitments 
 
CARICOM has entered into a number of bilateral trading arrangements both as an 
economic block and also as individual countries. Table 7 shows the hemispheric trade 
agreements with which CARICOM is involved and Table 8 presents agreements that are 
currently being negotiated or currently proposed. Most of CARICOM’s trade agreements 
are on a non-reciprocal basis although in recent times many of the bilateral trade 
agreements have sought to expose Caribbean firms to competition with firms of similar 
size in neighbouring countries. This is a deliberate attempt by CARICOM to adjust to the 
inevitable liberalised environment associated with the FTAA. Moreover, it has the effect 
of expanding the regional common marked and allowing for growing production in the 
region especially in Trinidad and Tobago, the industrial hub of the region. There has been 
marginal growth in trade between Latin America and CARICOM but not sufficient to 
cause fiscal problems in the region. 
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Table 7 CARICOM  Trade Agreements 
Agreement in Force  Date of Signature  Entry into Force 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)  1973  1973 
CARICOM-USA 1984  1984 
CARICOM-CANADA 1986  1986 
CARICOM-VENEZUELA 1992  1993 
CARICOM-COLUMBIA 1994  1995 
CARICOM-DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  1998   
CARICOM-CUBA 2000  2000 
CARICOM-EU (Cotonou)  2000  2000 
Source: 1.   Integration, Trade and Hemispheric issues Division, IDB 









































        
Guyana-
Brazil 
        
 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat   14
Free Trade Area of the Americas 
 
 
Within the next five years, the FTAA will remove nearly all barriers to trade and services 
in a market of nearly 800 million people and over 11 trillion dollars in GDP. This free 
trade area comprises the United States, Canada, and Latin America and the Caribbean. As 
with the EU, the FTAA is expected to have a negative impact on fiscal revenues in the 
short run. However the magnitude of trade from the USA suggests that the impact on tax 
base may substantial in the short run. Table 5 indicates that the level of trade with the 
United States is quite substantial, averaging 60 per cent of all hemispheric trade. 
 
The CARIFORUM-EU REPA 
 
The European Commission has proposed a Regional Economic Partnership Agreement 
(REPA) as a successor agreement to the non-reciprocal Lomé agreements. According to 
Bourne et al (1999), this proposal is essentially a Free Trade Area whereby the short run 
costs for CARIFORUM countries are likely to exceed the gains. Given that this potential 
agreement would be WTO plus
2. Bourne et al (1999) conclude that given the overall 
dependence of CARIFORUM countries on trade tax revenues the short-term effects of a 
REPA are clear. Tariff reduction would cause revenue loss, which would be further 
exacerbated by weakness in tax administration and narrowness of the tax base. These 
characteristics further constrain the ability of the Member States to diversify revenue 
sources. Bourne et al (1999) use Trinidad and Tobago as an example. They highlight the 
problems that the country encountered when introducing the value added tax. An 
underdeveloped business sector and register problems, among other things lead to tax   15
collection lags, which created divergence between actual and planned revenues. The 
analysis here is as before, conditional on the import elasticities since positive macro-
effects (expansionary import volume) can compensate or mitigate revenue loss. 
 
 
V.  Tax Structure of Caribbean Economies 
 
Peters (2002) indicates that the average tax rate
3 over the last two decades ranged from 
25% in Belize and the OECS to 38% and 32% in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago 
respectively. Tables 9 and 10 further illustrate the characteristics of Caribbean tax 
structure. In the smaller OECS countries taxes on international trade accounted for over 
50 % of tax revenue except in Montserrat where it was 46.1%. In the bigger Caribbean 
territories such as Trinidad and Jamaica, the dependence on trade taxes is lower but still 
high; it ranges from 8.5% in Trinidad and Tobago to 24.9% in Jamaica. Direct taxes 
account for significant portions of total revenue in the bigger Caribbean territories and a 
very small part in the smaller territories. In Trinidad Direct Taxes account for as much as 
60.6% of total revenue on average, whereas for Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica direct 
taxes are approximately a third of total tax revenue. There is also a dichotomy between 
smaller states and larger states on the role of domestic consumption taxes because 
consumption taxes are more significant revenue earners in the bigger territories than in 
the smaller territories mainly due to the introduction of a broad based consumption type 
VAT. The VAT accounts for 26.8 per cent of total revenue in Barbados, 20.8 per cent in 
Jamaica, and 18.0 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago. In the OECS, however, the revenue 
gained from consumption taxes on imported goods is substantial and in most cases 
transcends revenue earned from import duties. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Member States will be expected to lower tariff rates below WTO bound rates. 
3 This is defined as total tax divided by total income or GDP.   16
Table 9  Tax Structure: Taxes as a percentage of Total Tax Revenue in Select Caribbean Countries for the period 
1991-1996. 
 
  Barbados  Guyana  Jamaica  Trinidad 
DIRECT TAXES  43.1  38.6  37.5  61.6 
Taxes on Income, Profits, and Capital Gains of which:  31.5  36.8  36.8  60.6 
Companies  10.9  20.2  13.7  29.4 
Individual/PAYE  17.9  12.6  20.9  19.5 
Employment Levy  1.0  -  -  - 
Training Levy  1.2  -  -  - 
Transport Levy  1.3  -  -  - 
Health Service Levy  1.0  -  -  - 
Unemployment Levy  -  -  -  1.2 
National Health Surcharge  -  -  -  1.6 
Oil Royalties  -  -  -  7.7 
Withholding Tax  -  4.0  -  1.4 
Bauxite & Alumina  -  -  1.1  - 
Business Levy  -  -  -  0.8 
Interests & Dividends  -  -  5.5  - 
Other Taxes  2.7  -  -  - 
Taxes on Property  6.0  1.8  0.7  0.9 
INDIRECT TAXES  56.9  61.4  62.5  38.4 
Taxes on Domestic Goods and Services of which:  39.1  33.6  31.3  29.3 
Consumption Tax/VAT/GCT (Local)  26.8  -  20.8  18.0 
Highway Revenue  1.9  -  -  - 
Hotel and Restaurant Sales Tax  1.8  -  -  - 
Excise Duties  -  0.4  -  9.5 
Motor Vehicle Taxes  -  33.0  -  1.6 
Education Tax  -  -  0.9  - 
Contractor Levy  -  -  4.1  - 
Purchase Tax on Cars  -  1.3  0.3  - 
Other Taxes  7.3  -  5.0  0.5 
Taxes on International Trade and Transactions of which:  17.8  14.8  24.9  8.5 
Import Duties  9.1  12.4  0.3  5.5 
Export Duties  -  0.8  -  - 
Stamp Duties  8.8  -  1.2  2.6 
Custom Duty  -  -  11.8  - 
Airport Services  1.4  -    - 
Travel Taxes  -  -  1.5  - 
GCT Imports  -  -  12.9  - 
Bauxite Levy  -  -  6.2  - 
Other Taxes  -  12.2  -  - 
















   17
Table 10  Tax Structure: Taxes as a percentage of Total Tax Revenue in 1997 for the Eastern Caribbean 
DIRECT TAXES  0.7  16.4  30.2  14.2  41.4  25.2  30.8  31.9 
Taxes on Property  0.7  1.6  0.0  3.6  3.7  2.5  0.6  0.9 
Consumption Tax  -  -  3.4  10.4  0.0  1.5  3.1  3.4 
Source: ECCB
  Anguilla  Antigua  Dominica  Grenada  Montserrat  StKitts  StLucia  StVincent 
Taxes on Income, 
Profits, and Capital 
Gains of which: 
0.7  14.8  30.2  11.6  37.7  22.7  30.3  31.0 
Personal Income 
Tax 
0.0  3.1  13.9  2.8  31.4  6.9  12.1  13.9 
Corportate Income 
Tax 
0.0  7.9  16.3  8.7  4.9  15.1  12.2  13.6 
INDIRECT TAXES  99.3  83.6  69.8  85.8  58.6  74.8  69.2  68.1 
Taxes on Domestic 
Goods and Services 
of which: 
37.4  21.9  14.9  20.5  12.4  20.1  13.4  17.2  Hotel Occupancy Tax  14.1  1.6  0.3  -  0.3  5.6  3.9  1.9 
Entertainment Tax  0.0  0.0  0.1  -  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Telecommunications 
Tax 
-  3.4  -  -  -  1.0  0.7  1.4 
Insurance Levy  -  0.5  -  -  1.4  0.7  0.9  1.4 
Licenses  9.4  5.0  4.5  3.4  8.1  3.1  2.3  3.9 
Taxes on 
International Trade 
and Transactions of 
which: 
61.9  61.7  54.9  65.3  46.1  54.7  55.8  50.9 
Import Duties  55.2  18.9  13.8  14.8  8.6  30.4  17.9  12.0 
Export Duties  0.0  0.0  -  -  -  0.2  0.0  0.2 
Consumption Tax  -  27.6  37.4  37.1  16.9  23.1  26.6  31.3 
Customs Service 
Tax 
-  7.7  2.3  0.0  14.5  7.4  9.0  4.7 
Foreign Exchange 
Tax 
2.5  1.0  -  -  3.6  -  -  - 
Travel Tax  -  2.4  -  0.0  -  0.8  0.3  0.0 
Embarkation Tax  4.2  2.6  1.2  1.5  0.8  1.6  0.0  1.3 
Total Tax Revenue  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 Table 11  Tax Buoyancy in Select Caribbean Countries 
   
ANG  ANU  DCA  GDA MON  SKN  SLU SVG  BAR  GUY  JAM TNT 
Direct Taxes  -1.7 1.4  4.6  11.5  -1.2  1.1  0.4  2.1  -0.9  1.4  0.9  0.9 
Taxes on Income, 
Profits, Capital Gains 
-1.7 1.6  3.5  -0.5  -1.4  1.1  0.4  2.1  -0.8  1.4  0.9  0.9 
Taxes on Property  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.3  1.9  1.2  1.4 
Indirect Taxes  2.4 1.1 2.2  0.5  -1.0  0.8  0.9  1.2  1.0  1.2  1.1  1.3 
Taxes on Domestic 
Goods and Services 
3.0 1.2 5.2  0.6  0.9  1.2  1.6  1.6  -0.4  1.3  1.0  1.5 
Taxes on Int’l Trade 
&Transactions 
2.1 1.1 1.4  0.6  -1.3  0.7  0.7  1.1  2.5  1.1  1.2  0.9 
Total Tax Revenue  2.5 2.9 3.0  0.7  -1.1  0.9  0.7  1.5  0.1  1.3  1.0  1.0 
 
Source: ECCB 
Note: For Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago the period 1991-1996 was used to derive 
an average whereas for the other countries the year 1997 was employed. 
 
 
Table 11 illustrates the responsiveness of tax revenues in the Caribbean to changes in 
income or GDP. Over the period 1991 to 1996, the tax buoyancy coefficient was 1.0 per 
cent in Jamaica and Guyana due mainly to the high buoyancy for the indirect taxes. 
Barbados recorded low tax buoyancy overall and for both direct and indirect taxes. For 
the OECS countries, the indirect tax buoyancy coefficient ranges between 0.5 and 2.4, 
whereas the overall average tax buoyancy coefficient stood at 1.3, thus indicating a 
degree of elasticity between tax revenue and income.  
 
The reduction of import duties, associated with trade liberalisation often has the effect of 
reducing fiscal revenues because the level of tax receipts in small open economies is 
heavily dependent on import and export trends. There are a number of measures of 
dependence on trade taxes most notably the ratio of tax receipts from international trade 
to total tax revenue, which is employed by this paper. Another measure is the ratio of 
import duties to Gross Domestic Product
4. 
 
                                                           
4 For a detailed description and analysis of CARICOM fiscal dependence on trade taxes, using various 
measures, see Nicholls et al (1999). 
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Generally, import duty
5 as a percentage of total tax receipts is considered significant if it 
is in excess of 15 per cent (ECLAC: 1998). In a study of the impact of a EU-CARICOM 
Regional Partnership Agreement (RPA), Bourne et al (1999) classified degrees of 
dependence (ratio of import duties to total tax receipts) as low, moderate and high. Low 
dependence was characterised by ratios between 0 per cent and 15 per cent, moderate 
degrees of dependence were between 15 per cent and 30 per cent and high dependence 
was in excess of 30 per cent. 
 
Table 12:  Import Taxes as a Percentage of Fiscal Revenue, 1990-1999 
Year 
Country 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Antigua & Barbuda  52.08  54.84  54.75  54.12  51.48  51.83  51.08  49.71  50.36  48.08 
Anguilla  ...  65.97  67.84  48.33  54.92  53.23  58.25  57.04  65.57  63.18 
Bahamas  65.94  62.23  55.62  54.97  53.65  52.62  52.77  52.10  49.79  52.67 
Barbados  13.21  9.44 8.08 8.08 8.63 8.61 8.08 9.26 9.35 9.57 
Belize  51.54  51.86  47.82  49.20  49.70  52.97  34.41  31.57  33.50  34.77 
Dominica  17.84 18.21 17.45 17.61 14.67 14.27 13.99 14.98 13.53 14.61 
Guyana  11.39 10.23  9.50  12.59 12.82 11.58 11.67 11.80 12.06  n.a. 
Jamaica  n..  13.44 13.71 13.57 10.89 11.86 10.83 11.27 10.60 10.42 
St. Kitts & Nevis  53.49  50.29  48.29  26.24  49.13  45.57  45.33  44.23  42.04  43.57 
St. Lucia  51.92  50.49  50.01  50.57  48.34  48.01  47.89  44.71  48.61  47.08 
St. Vincent  51.09  49.62  48.71  47.60  45.91  48.94  43.60  44.93  42.75  43.26 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  8.17 8.08 9.36 9.35 7.71 5.80 5.20 6.25 7.22 7.23 
Source: ECLAC database 
 
Table 12 shows that in 1999, the ratio of import taxes to total tax revenue ranged from 
7.23 per cent in Trinidad and Tobago to 48.08 per cent in Antigua and Barbuda. The 
average degree of dependence for the CARICOM region was 29.39 per cent. What is 
easily discerned from Table 12 is that the OECS countries and Belize (the LDCs) are 
highly dependent on trade taxes as a source of revenue whereas the other countries 
(MDCs) are less dependent, fitting into the low dependency category. CARICOM as a 
region is moderately dependent on trade taxes as a source of revenue. Past evidence has 
indicated that declines in revenue have normally been smaller than expected given the 
stimulation of demand for imports. 
                                                           
5 In the Caribbean Community taxes on international trade and import duties are usually one and the same 
since export duties are rarely levied.    20
 
VI.  Tariff Levels within CARICOM  
 
Generally CARICOM has duty free trade among its members and a Common External 
Tariff against third parties. CARICOM also has multilateral commitments in relation to 
third countries, including tariff bindings. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is 
likely to create further WTO plus tariff commitments. 
 
Indications are that WTO agreements and outcomes of the Uruguay Round are 
incorporated into domestic legislation at varying degrees within the Community, but 
generally the Community has been slow in the implementation of these commitments. 
 
 
Tariff bindings differ considerably among CARICOM States and sometimes conflict with 
CET rates. It is not anticipated that WTO bound rates or phase CET reductions would 
have a significant revenue effects since considerable time for adjustment and reform 
enables Member States to take advantage of the opportunities presented by trade 
liberalisation while avoiding the pitfalls. 
 
The Common External Tariff (CET) governs trade between the Caribbean Community 
and third parties and serves as a protective trade instrument for the Community. In an 
effort to reduce protection, Member Stated agreed in 1992 to a four-stage reduction in the 
tariff rates, spanning over five (5) years. Table 2 below presents the proposed schedule of 
reductions. Few Member States have complied with the CET reduction tariff schedule. 
Member States do make an effort to introduce offsetting measures by increasing other 
duties and charges (most falling almost exclusively on imports).   21
Table 14 Tariff Reduction Schedule for CARICOM Member States 
  Period of Application  Period Allowed to Effect 
Implementation 
Rate Structure 
           MDC%  LDC% 
1 Jan 1993 – 31 Dec 1994   1 Jan 1993 to 30 June 1993   5-30/35  0-5 to 0/35 
1 Jan 1995 – 31 Dec 1996  1 Jan 1995 to 30 June 1995  2-25/30  0-5 to 5/30 
1 Jan 1997 – 31 Dec 1997  1 Jan 1997 to 30 June 1997  5-20/25  0-5 to 0/25 
1 Jan 1998 onwards    1 Jan 1998 to 30 June 1998  5-20  0-5 to 20 
              
Source: CARICOM Secretariat 
 
Most CARICOM countries bound their tariffs in the Uruguay Round at levels 
considerably higher than what is applied. For most Member States, the MFN bound rates 
transcend the CET. For example Jamaica bound its tariffs on imports of industrial 
products at a uniform rate at 50%, Agricultural tariffs were bound at 100%  (Chaitoo: 
2002). The WTO estimates that 55 per cent of Jamaica’s MFN tariff lines were duty free 
in 1998, 21 per cent of tariffs were between 20-25 per cent ad valorem, and 
approximately 7 per cent of tariffs were between 35-40 per cent. 
 
The fourth and final phase of the CET caps tariffs at 20 per cent, though agricultural 
commodities have higher rates. The OECS have been slow to implement phase IV of the 
CET and this in part reflects the adjustment difficulties that accrue as a result of high 
dependence on trade taxes.   22
Table 13 
CARICOM Tariffs in 1998- by Sections of the Harmonized System 1993 –(average Most Favoured Nation Applied Tariff) 
  ANU BAR BLZ DCA GDA GUY JAM MON SKN SLU SVG SUR TNT CARICOM 
Live Animal/ 
Products 
19.2 21.1 27.4 20.2 22.9 26.1 24.2 20.4  15.8 19.9 19.5 22.5 23.7 21.8 
Vegetable Products  16.2 18.9 18.8 19.2 18.7 19  18.9 18.8  15.7 19.1  19  18.7 18.6 18.4 
Animal/Vegetable 
Fats 
32.2 24.7 22.5 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7  23.2 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.3 
Processing 
Foods/Tobacco 
16.2 15.2 19.5 19.9 17.3 24.2 16.6 15.9  15.8 19.1 16.6 18.9 15.7 17.7 
Mineral Products  4.7 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.8 5.3 3.9  5.1 5  4.9 4.7 7.3 5.2 
Animal Hides/Skin  8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 0.6 8.6 8.6  8.5 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 
Wood/Wood Articles  8.6 8.6 9.5 8  8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6  8.5 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.6 
Paper/Cellulose 
Material 
6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.7  6.9 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 
Chemical/Industrial 
Products 
5.2 5.1 5  5.4 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2  4.9 5.5 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 
Plastic/Rubber  7.8 7.8 7.6 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.9 7.6  7.9 7.8 7.6 7.6 7.9 7.7 
Textiles  11 9.9 14.7  11.1  9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9  11.9  12.2  9.9 9.9  9.9 10.8 
Footwear/ Misc. 
Articles 
16.5 15.8 18  16.5 15.8 15.8 15.8 15.8  17.4 18.4 15.8 15.8 15.8 16.4 
Stone/Glassware  8.9 9  9.2 8.8 8.6 9  8.7 7.7  9.1 8.6  8.1 8.1 9  8.7 
Precious/Semiprec. 
Mat 
17  29.7 29.7 19.7 19.6 29.7 17  19.7  16.8 14.4 22.4 22.4 19.7 21 
Base Metals  5.7 5.5 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5  5.7 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.6 
Machinery/Electrical 
Equip. 
6.4 5.9 6  5.9 6.1 0.9 5.8 5.8  6.3 5.9 5.6 5.6 6.1 6 
Motor 
Vehicles/Vessels 
9.6 0.9 8.9  8.6 8.3 8.9 7.6 5.5  11.2  8.3  6.3 6.3  8.5 8.5 
Precious 
Instruments 
9.5  12.4 12.5  10.1 10.2 12.7 10  9  9.7  10.2  10  10  10.8 10.5 
Arms/Munitions  41.4 41.4 41.4 28.9 23.9 41.4 21.4 21.4  41.1 23.9 18.9 18.9 23.9 31.6 
Misc. Manufactured 
Articles 
15.4 14.9 15.6  15.2 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9  15  14.9  14.9 14.9  14.9 15.1 
Art/Antiques  17.5  20 18.1  20.8  20 20 20 20  20.6  20  20 20  20 19.8 
Overall  9.7 9.8 11.2  10.1  9.8 10.6  9.7 9.3  9.6 10.3  9.5 9.7 9.8 9.9 
Residual  7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9  7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 
ANU: Antigua & Barbuda; BAR: Barbados; BLZ: Belize; DCA: Dominica; GDA: Grenada; GUY: 
Guyana; JAM: Jamaica; MON: Montserrat; SKN: St Kitts and Nevis; SLU: St Lucia; SVG: St Vincent & 
Grenadines; SUR: Suriname; TNT: Trinidad & Tobago. 
Source: Jessen and Rodriguez (1999) 
 
 
   23
VIII. The Fiscal Impact  
 
According to a report on ‘Improving competitiveness for Caribbean Development’, 
prepared by the Caribbean Trade and Adjustment Group, estimates indicate that a 50 per 
cent multilateral liberalisation will result in 42 to 45 per cent decline in customs revenue. 
The Trade and Adjustment Group anticipates that this decline would be somewhat off-set 
by expansion in the taxable base that would occur as a result of increased imports and 
exports. 
 
Devarajan, Go and Li (1999) estimate import and export elasticities for 60 countries 
including some Caribbean territories. Table 14 displays those results. 
 
Table 14 Import and Export Elasticities for selected CARICOM States 
Country  Import Elasticity  Export Elasticity 
The Bahamas  1.50; 1.44  … 
Belize  0.66; 0.81  … 
Grenada  0.22 … 
Haiti  0.69; 0.62; 0.64; 1.62  0.43; 0.40; 0.37; 0.32; 0.30;  
Jamaica  0.24; 0.37; 0.24  0.45; 0.22; 0.30; 0.29; 0.38; 1.55; 1.47 
St Kitts & Nevis  2.80; 2.67  … 
St Vincent & the Grenadines  1.09; 0.47  … 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.81; 0.62; 0.78; 0.76; 0.61; 1.01  … 
Source: Devarajan, Go and Li (1999) 
… means not available. 
Note: For details of estimation methodology, number of observations and statistical attributes of estimates, 
see above captioned reference. 
 
 
Devarajan, Go and Li (1999) state that even if one of the elasticities is close to zero, 
revenue will decline unequivocally, reaching close to zero regardless whether the other 
elasticity is high. Moreover for imports to grow and tariff collection to compensate for 
the fall in tariffs, the import elasticity has to be high. They argue that due the balance of   24
trade constraint imports cannot substitute perfectly for domestic goods unless the supply 
responds by exporting. This means export elasticities must be high as well for tariff cuts 
to be self-financing. In the example they give, both elasticities have to be greater than 20.  
Clearly based on these criteria, tariff reduction in the Caribbean Community will not be 
self financing. 
 
Nicholls et al (1999) examine using an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model
6, the 
impact of tariff removal from the CARIFORUM-EU REPA on revenues. Their results 
indicate that for the OECS, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, tariff removal under a 
FTA would result in a decline of revenues from trade taxes. The estimated magnitudes of 
those changes tell a story because in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, revenues from 
trade taxes were projected to decline by 3.4 and 2.36 per cent respectively. The OECS 
revenues on the other hand would decline by 8.4 per cent. This outcome obviously is a 
direct function of dependence on trade taxes, since the OECS is highly dependent. In the 
OECS as whole tax collected on international trade represented 57.4 per cent of tax 
revenue in 1999 and 26. 3 per cent of the value of imports. Consumption tax was the 
main source of tax revenue (28.3 per cent of tax revenue), followed by tariffs (17.8 per 
cent) and customs service charges (7.3 per cent). Currently the OECS Member States are 
working on reform of the tax system with a view to introduce a value added tax. 
                                                           
6 This is an import expenditure function.   25
  CARICOM countries are extremely open, and not only are they big importers of 
consumer goods, but they are also big importers of production and intermediate goods. 
Merchandise trade accounts for in excess of 50 per cent of GDP (ECLAC: 1998) and 
when services are included this percentage is much higher. On the supply side their 
production base is fairly narrow, relying in most cases on a single commodity export for 
earnings. This constrains the ability of Caribbean economies to adjust quickly so as to 
mitigate the effects of short-term shocks. Moreover the highly specialised nature of 
CARICOM production structures greatly increases their fiscal vulnerability. Solutions, 
therefore, lie not only in tax reform but also in longer-term structural reform. It can 
already be inferred that the smaller countries of CARICOM will be more severely 
affected. Most available literature on this issue supports this conclusion. 
 
 
The 1997 Report on Small Economies and Western Hemispheric Integration 
(Independent Group of Experts) indicated that a major challenge with establishing a Free 
Trade Area of the Americas is to integrate countries of diverse size and levels of 
development. The Caribbean faces two constraints, namely small size and a lower level 
of development. Associated with small size are structural features such as high 
dependence on external trade, small domestic markets, un-diversified and sometimes 
mono-production structures with narrow tax bases. Mature and highly developed 
countries usually depend more on sales or value added taxes and hardly if at all on trade 
taxes, so high dependence on trade taxes is in some sense symptomatic of the level of 
maturity in an economy. CARICOM countries have attempted to reposition themselves in 
the new global economy by pursuing prudent macroeconomic management and regional 
integration. 
 
Naturally there are costs and benefits associated with any action, and in the case of the 
Caribbean lowering tariffs has immense potential especially in the area of expanding 
tourism and service production. The costs however are real in the short run, so the only 
alternative for Member States is to pursue alternative sources of income such as sales or 
value added tax. Because reforming the tax structure requires a new level sophistication, 
new more efficient methods of tax collection and administration, and a search for   26
alternative tax bases, fiscal reform can be a timely but worthwhile exercise. Many 
Member States have already started this process, and this must be an ongoing one.  It is 
important that Member States design and implement fiscal reform to maximise 
compliance while simultaneously providing incentives for savings and investment and the 
overall promotion of economic development.  
 
Over the years 1994 to 1998, the CARICOM region became more integrated with the 
international economy, as measured by their increasing degrees of openness. Government 
consumption on average has fallen relative to GDP. Trade shocks have taken the form of 
diminished preferential trading arrangements (PTA). In general, the revenue effects of 
trade liberalisation are uncertain. Blejer and Cheasty (1990), Tanzi (1989) conclude that 
ultimately the net impact of trade liberalisation on tax revenue is an empirical matter. 
Much depends on countries initial conditions and other tax measures that they introduce 
at the time of tariff reduction. Indeed depending on the level of import elasticities of 
substitution, revenues could possibly increase. If however import levels remained the 
same, the effect of a reduction in tariff rates would be to immediately lower revenue. 
However, imports are likely to expand given the reduced cost of importing, thus 
compensating at least partially for the lower taxation rates. How pronounced the net 
effect will be, is highly dependent on the initial level of tax rates as mentioned in the 
introduction. 
 
Ebrill et al (1999) state that revenue will least likely be affected or could even expand 
when: 
 
   The initial position is highly restrictive; 
 
   Trade liberalisation involves the tariffication of quantitative restrictions, the 
auctioning of licenses to import, or both; 
 
   Trade liberalisation includes such reforms as a reduction in tariff dispersion, the 
introduction of a minimum tariff, or the elimination of exemptions;  
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   Trade liberalisation is accompanied by reforms in customs and tax 
administrations, which also reduce the incentives to evade taxes; and 
 
   Trade liberalisation is supported by sound macroeconomic policies that ensure 
that liberalisation is consistent with external balance. 
 
The erosion of trade preferences in the European Union market and Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI) preferences under NAFTA
7 and the concomitant reduction in 
concessional finance and/or official development assistance (ODA) has made adjustment 
all the more challenging for CARICOM Member States. Weak tax administration in the 
Less Developed Countries (LDC) of CARICOM exacerbate the problem as they 
constrain the ability of the Member States to accumulate much needed public savings. 
Most states continue to reform their tax administrative systems and some have made 
substantial gains in this area. 
 
Moreover, intense competition among Member States for Foreign Direct Investment has 
caused Member States to offer overly generous duties and tax exemptions and diverse 
subsidies. This has put severe downward pressure on corporate income receipts (Loser: 
1999). As a result of this CARICOM States must streamline and rationalise their tax and 
investment incentive regimes
8. This is best accomplished through regional tax 
harmonisation and co-ordination efforts to reduce the brutal effects of competition for 





                                                           
7 See List of Acronyms and Abbreviations, p2. 
8 See Exploring Caribbean Tax Structure and Harmonisation Strategies, CARICOM Secretariat (5
th COFAP 
Meeting Research Paper).   28
Tanzi and Zee (2000) state that nominal tariff reductions are likely to cause short-term 
revenue loss, though in the long-run the response is conditional on import elasticities. 
They advocate three compensatory measures, namely: 
 
1.  Reducing the scope of tariff exemptions in the existing system
9 
 
2.  Compensating for the tariff reductions on excisable imports by a commensurate 
increase in their excise rates; 
 
3.  Adjusting the rate of the general consumption tax (such as the VAT) to           
meet remaining revenue needs. 
 
 
With regard to introducing a Value Added Tax valuable lessons can be drawn from the 
success of Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados. Countries need to remove overly generous 
tax incentive regimes.
10 Evidence from different sources (Devarajan, 1999; ECLAC, 




VIII. Trade Negotiation Solutions 
 
The Caribbean Community faces a number of challenges in the near future. The region 
will have to negotiate its way through a growing maze of trade negotiations at the 
regional, hemispheric, and international levels. At the regional level CARICOM 
countries are negotiating among themselves free trade in services, as part of a move 
toward the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. The FTAA and CARICOM-EU 
regional partnership agreements are major negotiations that involve CARICOM’s major 
trading partners namely the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Other 
negotiations include hemispheric bilateral agreements and the WTO (to include GATS). 
 
                                                           
9 This can be done by imposing a low minimum tariff on all imports. 
10 For detailed policy solutions, see Caribbean Trade and Adjustment Group report on Improving 
Competitiveness for Caribbean Development.   29
It is fair to state that given that CARICOM has non-reciprocal market access agreements 
with all of its major trading partners and with other countries (under the Generalised 
System of Preferences), CARICOM has little to gain from tariff negotiations with their 
main trading partners (Chaitoo: 2002). Over 95 per cent of Commonwealth Caribbean 
country exports receive preferential, non-reciprocal duty free entry into Canada and up to 
63.4 per cent of CARICOM exports receive duty free entry into the United States. 
Approximately 21.2 per cent of CARICOM exports face a 0-5 per cent tariff. 
CARICOM’s market access, therefore, compares favourably with other regional 
groupings such as the Andean Community (39.7 % duty free imports into the USA), 
Mercosur (61.4% duty free imports into the USA) and CACM (40.4 duty free imports 
into the United States. 
 
In general CARICOM’s approach has been one of promoting limited reciprocity for small 
countries with longer phase-ins of agreement terms and requisite safeguards (INTAL: 
2002). The underlying rationale for this approach is that CARICOM countries are acutely 
vulnerable to adverse economic shocks and these ‘special’ circumstances should be taken 
into account when applying XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). 
 
Chaitoo (2002) states  Trade Ministers under the FTAA market Access Negotiations 
decided in March 1998 at San Jose on the following: 
 
  The FTAA will be consistent with the provisions of the WTO, including GATT 
Article XXIV (1994) and its understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of 
the GATT 1994 to progressively eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers as well as 
other measures with equivalent effect, that restrict trade between participating 
countries. 
 
  All tariffs will be subject to negotiation 
 
  Different trade liberalisation timetables may be negotiated. 
   30
  To facilitate the integration of smaller economies and their full participation in the 
FTAA negotiations. 
 
Even though the FTAA is designed to be WTO compatible, it has been so structured to 
extend special and differential treatments to smaller economies (Arthur: 2001). Special 
and Differential treatments is therefore an obvious solution and CARICOM has 
continued to argue with success that their special circumstances warrant different 
treatment. Based on the analysis presented so far, it is clear that CARICOM countries 
will have to make a relatively greater economic and fiscal adjustment that other 
participating groups in the FTAA. This is due to CARICOM’s high dependence on trade 
taxes for government revenue, and its economic structure with a higher ratio of trade 
preference induced activity to GDP than anywhere else. The small size of CARICOM 
countries and high fixed costs associated with introducing replacement taxes means that 
effective participation in the FTAA will extended phase-in periods to allow these 
economies to adjust their production and fiscal structures. 
 
Special and Differential treatment should comprise the following: 
 
  FTAA must have longer phase-in periods; 
 
  Special derogations from agreed liberalisations where necessary; 
 
  Very high thresholds in particular sectors before liberalisation, for example 
government procurement; 
 
  Longer lists of sensitive industries than is normally the case; 
 
  Special arrangements to allow the small economies affordable access to costly dispute 
settlement mechanisms; 
 
  Technical assistance in relation to capacity building and institutional reform; and 
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  Access to a social cohesion or adjustment fund. 
 
 
The final trade negotiation solution is to start tariff negotiations at rates that are not too 
low, so as to concede before the process begins. The base rate should be as close to the 
WTO MFN rate as possible taking into consideration that the FTAA must be WTO-plus. 
 
 
IX. Fiscal  Solutions 
 
The magnitude of the impact of trade liberalisation is conditional on the type of fiscal 
structure a country may have. In the case of CARICOM, the governments are highly 
dependent on trade taxes. Hence, there is an obvious case for fiscal reform. 
 
First of all it is imperative that Member States pursue prudent fiscal management. This 
entails increasing public sector savings, efficient and effective public sector investment, 
and reducing wasteful transfers to loss-making state enterprises, cutting the ‘fat’ in civil 
service payrolls, and reducing the scope for wasteful spending. In this regard, there is 
urgent need for civil service reform. CARICOM countries have already seen 
improvements in their expenditure control systems and enhancement of tax and 
administration. Overly generous discretionary and distortionary fiscal incentive regimes 
need to be replaced with tax environments that are stable and credible. 
 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, countries can introduce compensatory measures like 
reducing the scope of tariff exemptions in the system in favour of imposing low 
minimum tariffs on all imports. This has the added benefit of removing distortions and 
raising the credibility of the tax system. Caribbean governments can also raise excisable 
duties on excisable imports to mitigate or compensate for revenue loss fom lower tariffs. 
In fact many Caribbean governments have introduced environmental levies, raised 
customs charges and raised consumption tax rates. 
 
One of the major fiscal adjustments solutions is to introduce and/or strengthen broad 
based taxes, such as the value-added tax and corporate and personal income taxes while   32
simultaneously developing alternative revenue or underused revenue sources such as 
property taxes and taxes on the self employed. 
 
The specific form a general broad-based indirect tax should assume is debatable but 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago have had success with the introduction of the VAT. 
The VAT collections have exceeded revenue expectations in Barbados and indeed this 
tax is known for its ability to enhance revenues. 
 
In conclusion, adjustment solutions revolve around improving efficiency and prudence in 
fiscal management both on the revenue and the expenditure side. CARICOM must 
reform its fiscal system to reflect a lower dependence on trade taxes and improve the 
credibility of the tax and incentive regime. 
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X.  Conclusion 
 
Trade Liberalisation will engender decreased reliance on border taxes and loss of fiscal 
receipts for Member States. The magnitude is difficult to assess, but indications are that 
in the short run revenue, shortfall could be substantial. Member States must pursue 
prudent fiscal management, keeping expenditures roughly in line with revenues, if 
possible expanding public savings. Member States must widen the tax net and develop 
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Appendix 
 
Table (i) Selected Indicators 

















(in % of 
GDP) 1998 
Manufacturing 
(in % of GDP) 
1998 
Services 














Antigua&Barbuda  0.6 2.8  3.5 0.1  4  18.9  77.1 0.833  442 8050 
Bahamas 3.7e  …  -0.9  0.3  … …  …  0.844     
Barbados  2.3 3.8  0.7 0.3  6.6  20  73.4 0.858  431 9121 
Belize 0.7  0.9  0.5  0.2  18.7  25.5  55.8  0.777  22,972  3,218 
Dominica  0.2 -0.4 1.4 0.1  20.2  22.5  57.3 0.793  750 3,668 
Grenada  0.3 3.6  2.2 0.1  8.4  22.2  69.4 0.785  344 4,040 
Guyana 0.7  3.2  8.9  0.8  34.7  32.5 32.8  0.709  214,970  761 
Jamaica 6.4  5  0.6  2.5  8 33.7 58.4  0.735  10,990  2,866 
Montserrat -  - -  -  -  -  - -  - - 
St Kitts-Nevis  0.3  3.3  4.5  …  4.6  24.3  71.1  0.798  269.4  6,420 
St  Lucia  0.6 2  1.4 0.2  8.1  18.9  72.9 0.728  616 4,206 
St  Vincent  0.3 2.3  2.6 0.1  10.9  26.9  62.2 0.738  389 2,907 
Trinidad&Tobago 6.4  6.7  2.1  1.3  1.8  47.5  50.7  0.793  5,128  4,230* 
Suriname 0.3f  …  0.5  0.4  … …  …  0.766  163,820  1,660* 
Source: CARICOM Secretariat, IMF 
* means in the year 1999 
 
Table (ii) Current Fiscal Balance in Millions of National Currency (Absolute) 
  Actual 
Countries 1991  1996  2001 
Bahamas  -14.5 40.7  57.4 
Barbados  100.4 51.7  121.5 
Belize  73.8 41.9 38.6 
Guyana  -6,559.3 11,173.6 -5,567.8 
Jamaica  3,872.1 -1,788.4 -12,410.0 
EC Currency Union  90.6 100.7  -85.4 
Suriname  -655.4 -6,082.0  22,190.0 
Trinidad & Tobago  651.7 745.8 784.9 
Source: Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies   38
Table (iii)  Current Fiscal Balances (in % of GDP) 
 Actual 
Countries  1991 1996 2001 
Bahamas  -1.1 1.0  2.4 
Barbados  3.0 1.3 4.0 
Belize  8.5 3.5 2.7 
Guyana  -0.3 11.3 -1.2 
Jamaica  8.0 -0.8  1.1 
EC Currency Union  1.6 1.6 1.0 
Suriname  -17.6 -3.0  -10.2 
Trinidad & Tobago  2.9 2.2 4.0 
Average  0.9 2.3 0.2 
 
Source: Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies 
 
Table (iv) Overall Fiscal Balance (in % of GDP) 
 Actual 
Countries  1991 1996 2001 
Bahamas  -3.9 -0.9 -1.9 
Barbados  -1.4 -3.2 -3.7 
Belize  4.9 -0.4  -11.4 
Guyana  -0.2 -1.6 -8.3 
Jamaica  3.6 -5.1  -6.9 
EC Currency Union  -2.1 -1.7 -6.5 
Suriname  -16.6 -3.0  -1.1 
Trinidad & Tobago  -0.2 0.5  -0.1 
Average  -2.0 -1.9 -5.0 
Source: Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies 